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Abstract—The malicious alteration of machine time is a big 
challenge in computer forensics. Detecting such changes and 
reconstructing the actual timeline of events is of paramount 
importance. However, this can be difficult  since  the  attacker 
has many opportunities and means to hide such changes. In 
particular, cloud computing, host and guest machine time can 
be manipulated in various ways by an attacker. Guest virtual 
machines are especially vulnerable to attacks coming from their 
(more privileged) host. As such,  it  is  important  to  guarantee 
the timeline integrity of both hosts and guests in a cloud, or at 
least to ensure that the alteration of such timeline does not go 
undetected. In this paper we survey the issues related to host and 
guest machine time integrity in the cloud. Further, we describe 
a novel architecture for host and guest time alteration detection 
and correction/resilience with respect to compromised hosts and 
guests. The proposed  framework  1  has  been  implemented  on 
an especially built simulator. Collected results  are  evaluated 
and discussed. Performance figures show the feasibility of our 
proposal. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Clouds offer a novel computing and  storage model that 
allows performing large calculations possibly in parallel, en- 
abling on demand service scaling following the number of 
requests, and possibly storing large amounts of data. All of this 
in an automated/autonomic setup without having to manage or 
pay the costs of a permanently deployed server farm. 
Cloud computing is based on virtualization technologies. 
Multiple Virtual Machine (VM) guests can be dynamically 
deployed on a large number of physical hosts. This allows 
cloud providers to respond to resource request by on-the-fly 
(de)provisioning the required resources. Virtualization enables 
additional monitoring/inspection techniques but it is also a 
threat to guest data privacy [1]. 
Clouds also represent a big challenge for security and pri- 
vacy. On the one hand they open the way to new cyberthreats 
and information security issues [1], which can be exploited 
by cybercriminals. In fact, an attacker can rent cheap cloud 
resources  and  apply  techniques  (e.g.  brute  force)  that  are 
 
1An extension of this work has been under revision since 2013. 
 
now more affordable than ever. On the other hand the cloud 
model potentially enables more advanced computer forensics 
techniques, since cloud technology allows seamless retrieval 
and storage of Virtual Machine status (i.e. VM images) [2]. 
The cloud of clouds will be the next revolution in the cloud 
computing paradigm. Applications will then span multiple 
clouds over the network. As the complexity and size of 
clouds grows,  it will  be increasingly  important to be  able 
to protect such federated resources, especially from timing 
attacks. Further, with an anticipated growth of mobile users of 
cloud services in the near future, issues related to the timing of 
distributed and replicated cloud services becomes challenging. 
In particular, pricing models, trust and security-related issues 
have to be addressed. 
A typical cloud or federated cloud scenario where multiple 
physical hosts run a large number of guest Virtual Machines, 
each with internal and external time sources is depicted in 
Figure 1. Cloud VM and service behavior are based on the 
timings they get through the internal virtual clock source 
exposed by the host. As such, time readings can be altered/- 
faked both by an attacker on the VM and by an attacker on 
the host. Time alteration attacks are quite common and well 
known in distributed systems [3]. However, cloud technology 
adds specificity to the problem [4]. Hence, the cloud scenario 
has to be modeled and investigated in order to improve the 
understanding of the problem and then to propose a remedy. 
In particular, prevention and detection of timing attacks are of 
uttermost importance in computer forensics [5]. 
 
A. the Problem 
In order to allow forensics in the cloud, getting the physical 
image of hard disks does not suffice [6]. As such, reconstruct- 
ing the timeline of even a single user process could be very 
tricky even for a computer forensic professional (e.g. when 
guest migration is possible). This is true even if remote logging 
is in place, (e.g. having a remote rsyslog server) since cloud 
hosts and their guests can manipulate the internal timing used 
to send log data. The main threat we want to protect the cloud 
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implemented; Section VI presents performance figures and 
discusses results; finally, in Section VII conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.   Cloud computing scenario 
 
 
from is the malicious machine time variation in both hosts 
and guests. Such malicious alteration would undermine the 
efficacy of collected digital evidence for computer forensics 
investigations. In fact, if the timeline can be faked then the 
forensic analysis could be (at least) questionable. 
The overall objective of this work is to improve resiliency of 
cloud hosts and guests in order to allow and ease forensics for 
the cloud, i.e. forensic activity aimed at investigating activity 
performed on the cloud by cloud and service providers and, by 
service users. Another goal is to gather as much information 
and insight as possible from simulating the possible attack 
scenarios. 
 
B. Contribution 
In  this  paper  we  introduce  a  generic  cloud  time  model 
and  survey  possible  attack  scenarios  and  countermeasures. 
We further provide a solution to the problem of protecting 
the timeline integrity (also referreto to as “good timeline” 
in the following) of events inside guests and hosts. The pro- 
posed CloRoFor (Cloud Robust Forensics) architecture detects 
timeline alterations and ensures the validity of the forensics 
investigation process. We also show how cloud computing 
model and technology can help forensic investigation, how a 
malicious time alteration can be detected and how the original 
good timeline of events can be reconstructed. Both host and 
guest timeline alteration scenarios are described. As regards 
the latter, cloud snapshot and rollback techniques have been 
leveraged to bring the VM back to the original unaltered state. 
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: 
Section II summarizes state of the art solutions applied to 
cloud resilience; Section III introduces a generic time model 
for cloud computing; Section IV shows the proposed CloRo- 
II. RELATED WORK 
Cloud security is of paramount importance today, but not 
much attention has been devoted to cloud timing attacks as to 
more traditional server timing attacks in the past [7], [8], [9]. 
Much recent efforts have been especially devoted to address 
cloud privacy issues. Work by Van Dijk [10] shows that fully 
homomorphic encryption (FHE), cannot enforce the privacy 
required by common cloud computing services. As such, cloud 
service security has to rely on additional privacy enforcement 
tools, such as tamper-proof hardware, distributed computing, 
and complex trust ecosystems. 
Further, the time taken by web sites to respond to HTTP 
requests can leak private information, using different attack 
types. Direct timing, measures response times from a web 
site to expose private information [8] such as validity of a 
username or the number of photos in a public gallery. Cross- 
site timing, allows obtaining information from another site [7]. 
Digital forensics in the cloud is quite a hot topic that has 
been investigated by Birk [11] and Franc [12]. The former 
analyzes  and  addresses  technical  issues  of  cloud  forensics 
whereas the latter attempts to use existing tools to collect data 
from the cloud and gives suggestions and tools on the subject. 
Also  Dominic  [13]  discusses  cloud  forensics  and  stresses 
the  decentralized  nature  of  data  processing  in  the  cloud. 
Dominic focuses on the technical aspects of digital forensics 
in distributed cloud environments and assesses whether it is 
technically possible for the cloud computing service customer 
to perform a traditional digital investigation. Marty [14] in- 
troduces a logging framework for the cloud to ensure that the 
data needed for forensic investigations has been generated and 
collected. Marty’s approach is complementar to our proposal in 
that focuses on easy and effective log collection. However, this 
approach does not protect against timing attacks such as the 
ones addressed here. Cloud forensics and privacy issues have 
been dealt with in [15] using homomorphic encryption [15] 
and commutative encryption. Two forensically sound schemes 
are provided so that the investigators can obtain the necessary 
evidence while the privacy of other users can be protected. 
Several papers in the literature have addressed anti-forensic 
attacks, i.e. attacks aimed at preventing forensic  analysis 
such as timing attacks. However, no general frameworks 
were developed to counter such attacks. A taxonomy of anti- 
forensic attacks and countermeasures is presented in [16]. An 
interesting work on live digital forensics addressing rootkits 
that is complementar to our work is by Carrier [17]. However, 
to the best of our knowledge, no previous work on cloud 
forensics has modeled, studied and addressed timing attacks 
in depth as present work. 
Another hot topic is mobile cloud forensics. This has been 
initially investigated by [18] introducing a service concept 
called “Forensic Cloud” and suggesting a simple technology 
framework for forensic analysis based on a mobile cloud. 
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Finally, there is previous work regarding adequate labora- 
tory specifications for emulating network attacks and exper- 
imenting with network forensics [19]. The findings of such 
work validate our testbed implementation. 
 
III. CLOUD TIME MODEL 
This section introduces a first high-level time model that 
is used to study, evaluate and discuss potential time-based 
abuses, threats and possible remedies. In particular a taxonomy 
of attacks and possible countermeasures is given. We aim to 
guarantee the timeline integrity of guest services. In this first 
model we assume a central unique remote trusted and pro- 
tected entity, namely a Cloud Controller (CC in the following, 
see Section IV), that cannot be altered or faked by an attacker. 
Agents are software units distributed in every cloud machine 
which manage their time and cloud time. 
DEF: Good Timeline: We define a good timeline to be a 
series of events (ei) in a machine that have strictly increasing 
associated timestamps (ts(ei)) for events happened one after 
another. 
DEF: Guaranteed Timeline: We define a Guaranteed Time- 
line as a series of events with associated timestamps, where 
we guarantee that for every event ex ey , ts(ex) < ts(ey ) iff 
ex happened before ey [20]. 
 
A. Abuse Cases 
Some of the possible “Abuse Case” scenarios that alter the 
normal “good timeline” are as follows: 
Abuse Case 1: an attacker obtains admin privileges on a guest 
VM. She changes machine time in order to alter and fake the 
timeline (of events). 
Abuse Case  2:  a  malicious  user  has  admin  privileges  on 
a cloud host and can change host and consequently guest 
machine time at will. 
In order to guarantee a good timeline to N distributed sys- 
tems hosted on M possibly malicious hosts, time information 
exchange, action and reaction systems have to be put in place. 
Different approaches can be taken: 
DTS Distributed Time Synchronization: time information can 
be distributed in P2P fashion and decision on the right 
timing is taken with a quorum approach; This approach 
can be distributed across different clouds but suffers from 
traffic explosion issues [21]; 
HTS Hierarchical Time Synchronization: periodic heartbeat 
timestamps (see Section IV-D) are broadcast from one or 
more secure CC to all hosts and their guests. Hosts must 
appropriately route such timing packets to all contained 
guests. Scalability issues exist if a reverse  channel  is 
used where all guest and host agents  are  required  to 
send periodic heartbeat timestamps back to the secure 
Time Stamp Service  (TSS, see  Section IV). This can 
cause feedback implosion issues, that can be handled in 
different ways [22]. 
A set of essential properties have to be guaranteed by a 
good timeline guarantee/verification system: 
• Accountability: based on the received timestamps, Time 
Controllers (TC, see Section IV) have to record times- 
tamp evolution over time. 
• Resiliency: a guest has to be resilient against  one  or 
more malicious hosts and vice-versa. Of course it is more 
difficult for a guest to be resilient to host-based attacks. 
Details can be found in tables I,II,III,IV. 
 
B. Scenarios 
1) Secure Channels with Unforgeable Agents: A  secure 
channel is defined as a channel protected by a symmetric 
session key eventually augmented with an asymmetric hand- 
shake phase. A number  of  key  management  solutions  can 
be deployed. Encryption keys are protected with anti-forging 
mechanisms leveraged by agents (see code obfuscation and 
keys below [23]). 
2) Secure Channels with Forgeable Agents: The ultimate 
attack detection decision is due to the guest agent, such 
decision has to be implemented using a conditional jump 
instruction that the host can intercept. The goal here is to 
prevent the host from intercepting conditional jumps or test 
instructions inside the guest VM [24] [25]. This is difficult 
since the host platform can access all physical and virtual 
resources of guest VMs. Code obfuscation [26] can help 
protecting the guest from host interception. In order to achieve 
that, the code can obfuscately compute a function [27] of a 
large input data (e.g. different time probes taken in different 
ways from the agent). As such, the output will not be a simple 
true/false result but a combined result that only the destination 
CC can validate and extract information from (optionally the 
sent data can be signed by the sender) [28]. 
 
C. Assumptions 
One agent exists for  each guest and  for each host.  Ev- 
ery agent is implemented using a different code obfuscation 
method and hides its own symmetric key or an asymmetric 
key in the code. All guest and host agents symmetric keys or 
counterpart asymmetric keys are known to the CC (that can 
be a single point of failure). 
 
D. Time Resiliency with Unforgeable Agents 
Guest Time Resiliency 
This is the case of “Guest Time Resiliency assuming Agents 
are not forgeable” (see Table I). 
Host Time Resiliency 
This is the case of “Host Time Resiliency assuming Agents 
are not forgeable” (see Table II). 
 
E. Time Resiliency with Forgeable Agents 
Guest Time Resiliency 
This is the case of “Guest Time Resiliency assuming Agents 
are forgeable” (see Table III). In this case it is very difficult 
to detect whether a non-malicious guest is reporting some 
violation or the guest agent is actually malicious and as such 
it cannot be trusted. Further, the host can forge any message 
or response coming from any hosted guest, given that in this 
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Table Malicious Guest Non Malicious Guest 
Malicious Host Both Host and guest agent detect alteration
and inform CC. Heartbeat reveals possible 
shutdown of Agents. Guest migration could 
improve the resiliency of the Guest machine
Agent on the guest can notify the CC that
Host is compromised. CC takes countermea- 
sures 
Non Malicious Host Host immediately intercepts [25],[1] guest
attempts to modify clock and prevents them: 
guest agent exposes a service to get guest 
time and then compare that with the Host 
time 
Ok by definition 
TABLE I 
UNFORGEABLE AGENTS: GUEST TIME RESILIENCY 
 
 
Table Malicious Guest Non Malicious Guest 
Malicious Host Both Host and guest agent detect alteration
and inform CC. Heartbeat reveals possible 
shutdown of Agents. 
Guest Agent can probe host services and
detect host time has been altered: can notify 
the CC that Host is compromised. CC takes 
countermeasures 
Non Malicious Host Malicious guest cannot affect Host Time Ok by definition 
TABLE II 
UNFORGEABLE AGENTS: HOST TIME RESILIENCY 
 
 
 
scenario, keys in agents cannot be ultimately protected. This 
leads to alternative solutions where probing the actual time 
has to be done indirectly: 
• creating interactive service requests and analyzing the 
obtained responses to infer internal service times; 
• capturing and analyzing actual service request and re- 
sponse packets in order to passively infer internal service 
times. 
Such probing has to be done externally to the malicious 
entity. If services are not interactive (i.e. request/response) but 
long-running batch jobs [29], then there must be a way of 
interrupting them in order to get partial responses. Of course 
smart semantics-aware packet sniffing is a requirement for this 
kind of analysis. 
Agent protection is based on code obfuscation [30] [31] 
[32]. As  in  [33]  [34]  the  goal  is  to  be  able  to  perform 
a similar computation that yields probabilistic values. Such 
probabilistic results can always be decoded by the CC in order 
to infer a true/false result. It is however possible to compute an 
intermediate result based on embedded key input (and a shared 
time). Based on such encoded partial result it is possible for 
a CC (who has counterpart key) to extract a true/false final 
result. Such final function is extremely difficult to compute 
without a pre-shared secret (and a shared time) [28]. Hence 
we obtain a function that is difficult to reverse-engineer and 
to emulate. 
Host Time Resiliency 
This is the case of “Host Time Resiliency assuming Agents 
are forgeable” (see Table IV). 
 
IV. CLOROFOR ARCHITECTURE 
This section describes the CloRoFor architecture for pro- 
tecting cloud guests and hosts from possibly malicious time 
alterations. Definitions of the most important CloRoFor com- 
ponents and of their scope and interactions is given. The main 
architectural  goal  of  CloRoFor  is  to  provide  a  framework 
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Fig. 2.   Proposed Architecture 
 
 
where selected components can be deployed in order to detect 
and react to attacks and anomalies in the cloud timelines. 
In Figure 2 the proposed architecture is depicted. The main 
CloRoFor component is the local Agent. The Agent is an 
abstraction comprising all actors (TSS, CTC, GTC, HTC) 
showed in the following. 
 
A. Time Actors 
Time Actors are the abstract model of the entities which 
contribute to the Cloud Time Model. Every actor is imple- 
mented as an Agent and deployed into a physical/virtual 
machine of the Cloud. 
 
B. Software Agents 
In this section we give further details on software agents, 
relating them with security aspects depicted in IV-D: 
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Table Malicious Guest Non Malicious Guest 
Malicious Host A  malicious guest can pretend behaving
well  when  on  a  non  malicious  host.  NO 
detection
Malicious Host  can  forge  both  host and
guest agent. so NO detection 
Non Malicious Host Host  detects guest time alteration: host
could intercept guest network packets [1], 
understand packets type and compare packet 
timestamp with Host time. But guest agent 
might lie and tell CC that host is malicious. 
Then CC has to choose.
Ok by definition 
TABLE III 
FORGEABLE AGENTS: GUEST TIME RESILIENCY 
 
 
Table Malicious Guest Non Malicious Guest 
Malicious Host totally NO Detection Host can forge guest agent. NO detection
Non Malicious Host Host detects guest time alteration but guest
agent  might  lie  and  tell  CC  that  host  is 
malicious. Then CC has to choose 
Ok by definition 
TABLE IV 
FORGEABLE AGENTS: HOST TIME RESILIENCY 
 
 
 
• Def (Guest Agent, GA): every Guest has a software Agent 
whose code is obfuscated and contains symmetric and/or 
asymmetric keys. 
• Def (Host Agent, HA): every Host has a software Agent 
whose code is obfuscated and contains symmetric and/or 
asymmetric keys. 
• Def (Cloud Controller Agent, CA): the Cloud Controller 
has a software Agent whose code can (optionally) be 
obfuscated and contains symmetric and/or asymmetric 
keys. 
The core of the agent is the TimeController (TC) entity 
that monitors the machine timeline and delivers and receives 
heartbeats. 
 
C. Time Controller 
• Def (Time Stamp Service, TSS): is a service that updates 
local time from one or more reliable external timing 
sources and it is built into the CC; 
• Def (Cloud Time Controller, CTC): invokes the TSS in 
order to update the Cloud controller (CC) time; the CC 
features a local agent called CA which implements the 
CTC. 
• Def (Guest Time Controller, GTC): traces the Guest 
timeline and sends such traces to the CC; for every Guest 
a local agent exists called GA implementing a GTC. 
• Def (Host Time Controller, HTC): the Host Time Con- 
troller is analogous to the GTC but for the host time and 
the HA is the HTC implementing agent. 
 
D. Key Security Considerations 
We assume that host and guest agents communicate with the 
CC agent through a secure channel. Said that, we can discuss 
the most important security aspects: 
Time Heartbeat: Every guest and host sends a periodic 
heartbeat (HB) packet containing timestamp information to 
the CC through the above-defined secure channels. This one 
is needed to get the guest/host status and timestamp at every 
 
moment (following the sync properties seen before). The 
nature of the HB is dual: it communicates the existence of 
the peer and its timestamp. 
Anti-forging mechanisms: Assuming that agents are un- 
forgeable, the mechanisms to implement that, it is via code 
obfuscation. An example of this technique is Skype client that 
makes use of various tricks like junk code to protect encryption 
keys and code from the reverse engineering technique ([35], 
[36]). Agent code (and keys inside it) must be frequently 
updated to minimize the probability of reverse engineering. 
Key Management: It is needed only in the case Agents are 
unforgeable because, in the case the Agents are forgeable, we 
must consider the keys lost and in the hands of the enemy. The 
keys are embedded in the Agents and protected by obfuscation 
mechanisms (see [27]). Said that we have two cases: 
• Symmetric keys: the CC has to store all host and guest 
keys (this would bring scalability problems [37]); 
• Asymmetric keys: every guest has to store CC public 
key and the CC has to store public keys for all guests and 
hosts; Guests, hosts and CC exchange symmetric session 
keys through an asymmetric handshaking phase. Session 
keys are used to encrypt the above defined channels; 
 
E. Cloud Oracle 
The cloud controller (CC) is the single unique trust object 
in the cloud and it finally decides about ambiguous use cases 
such those in the Section III-C. For example it answers the 
following questions: 
• Both host and guest are signaling each other as malicious: 
which one is really malicious? 
• Many hosts have been signaled as malicious: are they 
really malicious? Or are the ones that signal them? 
Out of the first Proof of Concept is the Cloud’s Oracle and 
other details that are not relevant to the overall result. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
This section provides details over the implementation of a 
first prototype of the proposed architecture. This includes the 
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cloud simulator that has been especially designed to test and 
stress as much as possible clouds composed of real nodes. 
In this work we implemented a Proof of Concept of the 
Agent. We chose to implement the prototype in Java for the 
following reasons: 
• the high level language introduces some overhead which 
can help simulate the effect on performance of an obfus- 
cation function; 
• the language offers the possibility of extending the sim- 
ulation on more than one machine; 
• the language allows for fast implementation tuning and 
evolution. 
The obfuscation of the communication channel is an im- 
portant part of the security model. The reason why is that 
detection/security-related information has to be kept as hidden 
as possible from an attacker. In fact, we chose not to leverage 
well known protocol implementations such as SSL, since it 
would have made easier for an attacker on the host side to 
infer information from the guest VM. We also chose not to use 
the TCP protocol because it would not have been efficient for 
HB message exchange (as it would have required connection 
establishment at each HB exchange). TCP was discarded also 
because using UDP for all communications is potentially less 
be it network congestion, malicious host intervention or guest 
inability to send (crashed or victim of a successful attack). 
For the authentication of the peers the mechanism used is 
the challenge/response with keys that are hard coded in the 
obfuscated code. As a consequence, keys are renewed by 
updating the code containing them. 
The Heartbeat channel: Every message, such Heartbeat or 
Heartbeat+Signal message, has an ordinal attribute to build the 
timeline of the sent or received messages. That ordinal number 
allows the analyzer to check for anomalies, like those where 
for growing ordinals there are not corresponding growing 
timestamps. 
We chose not to separate the signaling (anomalies, etc) 
channel from the regular HB channel. This is so in order to 
protect as much as possible the signaling from tampering and 
blockage. In fact a malicious host might intercept spurious 
datagrams not sent at regular intervals. In fact, an irregular 
sending time would possibly mean to the CC that the packet 
contains some other kind of information. A malicious host 
would most probably try to suppress such messages as the CC 
would not notice that packet is missing. Hiding the signaling 
channel inside regularly-spaced HB timestamp packets has 
advantages and disadvantages: 
prone to tracking [38]. So we adopted a datagram protocolADV1  : with covert channel the attacker has to decrypt and 
such  as  UDP  and  our  own  implementation  of  the  secure 
channel and compromising signaling. 
semantically interpret the datagram content in order to 
make use of it; 
Additional  simulation  components:  in  order  to  modelADV2  : the signaled event/status can be tied to a particular point 
the behavior of a particular action/functionality request, we in time and as such replay attacks are not possible; 
implemented in a class SimulationModel a method askOracle() DIS1  : any signaling of anomalous conditions/alarms is de- 
that implements the desired behavior (e.g. failure probability 
according to a chosen distribution). Every node and object 
instance can instantiate a different SimulationModel (SM) ob- 
ject, thus behaving in a different way. Groups of nodes/object 
instances can instantiate/refer to the same SM object and thus 
we can model complex system interactions failure probability. 
Time controller and TimeStamp Service: The main imple- 
mentation objects are the Time Controller (and its declination 
for Hosts, Guest and Cloud Controller, HTC, GTC and CTC) 
and  the  Time  Stamp  Service  (TSS).  A  TSS  on  the  cloud 
controller is different from the TSS on Guests or Hosts because 
it could have a connection to an external source to get a faithful 
and trusted time. In this implementation we consider the time 
of the Cloud Controller as trusted, so there are not differences 
through TSSs. HTC and GTC share the same implementation 
as they behave in the same way. 
Secure channel: As a first PoC, we developed a symmetric 
ciphered channel for channel confidentiality. The asymmetric 
case is an extension of this one. The peer agents know the 
symmetric key and encrypt the Datagram packets with it. 
Given that UDP is not reliable, we could introduce redun- 
dancy in transmissions, sending burst of the the same packets 
repeated for N times, in order to minimize the loss probability. 
However, using bursts does not solve the packet loss issue. On 
the contrary, it makes it worse. This is the reason we simply 
do not try to recover lost datagrams. On the contrary, we 
see the lack of reception of a timestamp packet as a security 
warning. If the lack of datagram from a source node continues 
we can increase consciousness that something bad happened, 
ferred up until the following heartbeat packet departure, 
this can potentially allow the attacker to perform further 
damage. 
Heartbeat packets are in the form HB(challenge, signal 
payload, timestamp) for the those packets sent from the CC to 
the Guests/Hosts and HB(response, signal payload, perceived 
time) for those sent from the Guest/Hosts to the CC. The Cloud 
Controller (CC) verifies timelines and can alert an external 
entity or can directly warn the administrator. However, such 
signaling from guest or hosts to the CC has to be protected as 
it can be exploited by the attacker to induce false detections. 
As a countermeasure against man in the middle attacks, the 
datagrams that are sent contain ordinal sequences as described 
above. 
 
A. A Cloud Simulator 
We designed and implemented a software simulator (it will 
be soon released as open source) that could allow performing 
experimental activity over the CloRoFor solution we devised. 
The simulator models a cloud scenario with multiple hosts 
each running a number of guests. The simulator runs inside 
a JVM and actually implements the software components that 
are part of the CloRoFor architecture. The simulator executes 
agents as software threads that actually perform computation 
over data coming from actually sent and received datagram 
packets. This  way small  scale  results can  be obtained but 
also validated in a real testbed. The simulator also allows 
performing wide scale experiments before actual large scale 
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deployment. We decided not to make use of existing cloud 
simulators for a variety of reasons: 
• The cloud simulator Cloudsim [39] did not allow to 
actually implement and study the behavior of the required 
functionality and to collect packet loss statistics; 
• The network simulators ns-2 and ns-3 [40] would not 
allow to simulate complex interactions among cloud 
guests and hosts. 
 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Present  section  describes  the  experimental  activity  per- 
formed on the prototype and aimed at extracting useful in- 
formation on the behavior, scalability and limitations of the 
proposed approach. This section also aims at measuring the 
impact of a number of malicious/lost nodes on the overall 
cloud. 
The experimental activity aims  at  evaluating  the  capac- 
ity of our system to detect node compromising and, as a 
consequence, react and restore security. The robustness to 
attacks can be measured using the following indicators in this 
scenarios: 
• Malicious Attack: Erroneous Timeline, Erroneous Re- 
sponse, Heartbeat miss. 
• Packet Loss/Delay: Host congestion, Network congestion. 
• Node failure: HeartBeat Loss, Heartbeat Response. Over 
the implemented CloRoFor prototype actual function- 
ality and performance tests have been performed and results 
shown and commented in the present section. 
 
A. Test Plan 
Tests have been performed over a virtual Cloud of seven 
virtual machines, each with a Linux-based OS (Fig. 3). Every 
VM has 512 MB of RAM, Linux, Java 1.6 JVM, 1 Processor 
assigned to the VM. Every VM is a Cloud Host: the first one 
only contains the Cloud Controller jthread (Java Threads), the 
other ones the sets of Guest jthreads. Every Guest runs an 
Agent with its Time Controller (TC) executing inside it. 
Running the current  CloRoFor version  implies having a 
maximum of 400 simulated guests (as jthreads). Since HTC 
and GTC are the same, we count HTC as TC. So the 400 
TC are composed of GTCs and of one HTC. The value 400 
is an  upperbound for  TCs because  it  corresponds to  circa 
2400 VM’s OS threads (every Agent implementation features 
around 6 VM threads for each one Agent jthread), which is 
the maximum limit supported by the standard Linux kernel. 
However, we consider this value a reasonable upperbound that 
does not affect simulation results. 
Every CloRoFor instance has a configuration file in which 
CloRoFor parameters are defined. For this first series of tests 
we configured them as in Table V. Some considerations are 
needed about config parameters. As regards guest failure 
percentage, in general, guest VM failures are induced by the 
failures on their host. Other guest failures can only be due 
to virtualization issues that can affect guest behavior. Said 
that, we assume the cloud system as highly reliable, and the 
assumed failure percentage exclusively due to guest failure 
has been set to 0.001%. 
 
As regards delay timing, we configured the system in order 
for an HB packet to be sent every 30 sec. from a Guest to the 
CC (through the Host). The CC checks the received packets 
every 30 sec. for response and timeline correctness, and every 
5 min. for the timeout threshold. It is worth noting that by 
“Timeout” we mean that the packet arrives to the CC but only 
after the expiration of the 5 min. timeout threshold (ex: a 
packets arrives after 5 min. and 10 sec.). 
In the tests we varied the overall running time of CloRoFor 
simulation. Every single test was repeated at least 4 times. 
Running time was set to: 30, 60, 120, 240 and 480 minutes 
(following a quadratic growth law to minimize the trails 
number and maximize test significance). 
HBs arriving to the CC are analyzed in order to find 
Timeline-, Timeout- or Response-errors. Errors are possibly 
introduced by infrastructure problems (failure probability) or 
by attacks (hacking probability). An HB with errors is captured 
and then deleted from the CC data structures to  limit the 
simulator footprint in memory. As such, it is not presently 
possible to trap HBs with more than one error. This limitation 
of the simulation model is induced by the implementation 
of this first prototype. Trapping more than one error for HB 
would have meant maintaining large data structures for too 
long thus limiting simulation running time. In this first Java 
prototype we did not focus on memory optimization but only 
on the interesting insights and results we could get from this 
first series of simulations. An extension to this work could be 
to maintain the trapping history (instead of packet history) of 
every guest/hosts to minimize that memory footprint. However, 
we consider the present prototype and test setup to be more 
than adequate for the kind of simulations we were interested 
in performing. 
 
B. Simulation Results 
In Figure 4 and 5 we plotted the number of Timeline-, 
Timeout- and Response-error packets and the false positive 
(FP) percentage of these kind of errors (notice the x-axis 
scale). The FP shows how many error packets  are due to 
the infrastructure (simulated) failure instead of the hacking 
(simulated) activity. 
Response errors FP (Fig. 5) are always zero and this is 
natural because there is no infrastructure problem (we assume 
the transport layer does not produce any malformed UDP 
packet) that can induce a response error. Only malicious 
hacking activity on the guest or host can induce them. As 
such, we simulated them in these two test sets. 
Timeout errors in Fig. 4 (with the meaning we explained 
above) are low if the running time of the simulator is short 
and increase (exponentially) as the simulation time enlarges. 
This seems natural since the longer the time of computation, 
the higher is the number of packets that are traveling. The 
exponential  growth  of  the  packets  and  the  FP%s  tends  to 
100%. The reason why is that system performance degrades up 
to a point where it cannot cope with packet analysis anymore. 
Timeline errors FP (Fig. 5) can only be observed when 
the  system  is  heavily  loaded.  This  is  a  very  interesting 
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Fig. 3.   Testbed: simulated Hosts and Guests 
 
 
phenomenon because the system is under pressure and this 
increases the time required for an HB to arrive to the CC. 
Further, it increases the probability that some packet will 
arrive out of order at the destination. This is surely related to 
our decision to implement the communication layer using the 
UDP protocol instead of TCP. 
 
In order to better understand/show the evolution over time 
of the system, in Figure 6 we plotted the frequency distribution 
over time of Timeout-, Timeline- and Response-errors. It 
appears on the one hand that Timeline- and Response-errors 
follow very similar linearly decreasing curves (as the x-axis 
is  logarithmic  in  time).  Same  similarity  is  present  in  Fig. 
4. This seems natural since the environmental conditions of 
the simulations were the same for  these  two  phenomena. 
The above curves are linearly decreasing, this means that 
Timeout-errors phonomenon eventually dominates the other 
two  phenomena.  As  such,  the  simulated  system  shows 
 
Timeline- and Response- errors appear as affected by 
timeout-errors more than other. On the other hand, the 
Timeout error frequency line, slightly decreasing at first, 
shows an exponential growth for larger x values. This can be 
due to a saturation effect in the system due to the fact that 
additional delays add up in the system (same as in the Fig. 
4). 
 
 
 
The most evident result from the experimentation is that the 
FP Timeline is low even when the FP Timeout increases. This 
shows our implementation is accurate for Timeline because 
it preserves Timelines from infrastructure errors. At the same 
time it emerges that the our Java implementations poses too 
much overhead on the network and this is reflected by the 
Timeout-errors high number and high FP which limits the 
simulation duration. 
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Parameter Name Value Notes/Explanation 
HeartBeat delay sending time 30 sec. the value is reasonable to not overload the
whole  system  while  having  a  reasonable 
sending time too 
CC  checking  time  interval for  packet 
respons errors 
30 sec. checking time is aligned to the sending time
CC  checking  time  interval for  packet 
timeline errors 
30 sec. checking time is aligned to the sending time
CC  checking  time  interval for  packet 
timeout errors 
5 min. after minutes of time you can consider the
arriving packet as an overtime packet. So 
Timeout is reached 
Guest failure probability 0.001% Guests do not fail, but representative per-
centage has assigned 
Host failure probability 2% Hosts fail for many reasons and considering
their often better quality hardware the fail 
probability is very low 
Guest probability of being hacked 5% It is not so common to be hacked So the
hack probability it has to be higher of fail 
probability but not too much. 
Host probability of being hacked 2% Hacking an Host requires very high skill and
knowledge of the infrastructure because the 
Host is not exposed as the Guests in it. So 
we assigned the same probability of the fail 
case
TABLE V 
SIMULATION  PARAMETERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.   Simulation results: erroneous packets for Timeout, Timeline and Response 
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Fig. 5.   Simulation results: erroneous packets false positive for Timeout, Timeline and Response 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.   Simulation results: frequency distribution of erroneous packets for Timeout, Timeline and Response 
11
 
 
C. Discussion 
Timeline integrity is a general concept related to the 
integrity security principle, that can be applied to a large 
number of heterogeneous cases and environment. In particular 
the Good Timeline property we have introduced in present 
paper is particularly useful in the cloud and in the federated 
cloud scenarios. In digital forensics analysis, having already 
or being able to reconstruct a good timeline is a key success 
factor that too often is not taken into consideration. This is 
probably due to the fact that most often the “Time” factor 
is considered as immutable in the digital world similarly to 
the real world. Establishing a good timeline is a fundamental 
factor especially in a virtualized environment and, on a larger 
scale, in a cloud. 
Cloud forensics requires a deeper analysis of the “Good 
timeline” and this work with its experimental results are in 
our opinion a relevant forward step on that subject. 
 
This paper presents some relevant  outcomes:  it  stresses 
the importance of the problem of maintaining a good Cloud 
timeline for forensics purposes; it suggests the approach to log 
timeline problems in real time, implementing the Live Digital 
Forensics paradigm; it proposes an open source Java simulator 
to analyze the “good timeline” of a cloud environment; it 
analyzes in depth the security aspects, and the limits, of every 
peer in the cloud; it produces an high-level “cloud time model” 
to focus on the scenario where the timeline is compromised; it 
gives experimental evidence that helps to increase the common 
knowledge on the subject. 
Present work could not delve much into specific attack sce- 
narios and countermeasures due to time and space constraints. 
However, we believe the main points that can be addressed in 
further work are: the scalability of the specially-built simulator 
in Java can be improved in order to perform tests with a 
larger number of nodes; a distributed Java approach but also 
other programming languages are being evaluated; some more 
complex attack scenarios can be analyzed, described and 
addressed in a more specific future work; the probabilistic 
model simulating attacks and failures can be enriched  in 
order to study and evaluate more complex attack scenarios; 
“threshold levels” can be extracted and studied in order to 
balance between service security and availability; 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to the protection of timeline integrity, 
in particular regarding the malicious alteration of cloud virtual 
machine time. Our contributions help improving the resiliency 
of cloud hosts and guests in order to allow and even ease 
forensics for the cloud. 
In particular, a generic cloud time model is introduced and 
possible attack scenarios, consequences and countermeasures 
are surveyed. As well as issues related to host and guest 
machine time security and a novel architecture for cloud host 
and guest time alteration detection and resilience has been 
introduced. A cloud load and topology simulator has been 
designed and implemented (soon to be open sourced) that 
allowed us to perform experimental activity over the CloRoFor 
solution we devised. 
The proposed CloRoFor architecture detects timeline alter- 
ation and guarantees the validity of the forensic investigation 
process. Both host and guest timeline alteration scenarios are 
described. As regards the latter, cloud snapshot and rollback 
techniques have been leveraged to bring the VM back to the 
original unaltered state. Simulation results show the feasibil- 
ity of the proposed system. Preliminary performance figures 
support the viability of our approach. 
Future Work will be focused on distributed timeline integrity 
verification and on memory optimization of the implementa- 
tion to increase test duration and collected data size. 
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